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A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC AND
CLASSICAL LOGICS. II: SEMANTICS
SERGEY A. MELIKHOV
Abstract. Three classes of models of QHC, the joint logic of problems and proposi-
tions, are constructed, including a class of subset/sheaf-valued models that is related to
solutions of some actual problems (such as solutions of algebraic equations) and com-
bines the familiar Leibniz–Euler–Venn semantics of classical logic with a BHK-type
semantics of intuitionistic logic.
To test the models, we consider a number of principles and rules, which empirically
appear to cover all “sufficiently simple” natural conjectures about the behaviour of the
operators ! and ?, and include two hypotheses put forward by Hilbert and Kolmogorov,
as formalized in the language of QHC. Each of these turns out to be either derivable
in QHC or equivalent to one of only 13 principles and 1 rule, of which 10 principles
and 1 rule are conservative over classical and intuitionistic logics. The three classes of
models together suffice to confirm the independence of these 10 principles and 1 rule,
and to determine the full lattice of implications between them, apart from one potential
implication.
1. Introduction
The paper is organized as follows. Models of QHC are discussed in the last chapter
(§4), which is rather short due to the previous preparation. Namely, since equivalent
principles and rules have the same interpretation in every model, our study of models
is aided by a preceding study of the lattice of implications between principles and rules
(also known as the lattice of extensions of QHC) in §3. Some of these principles and
rules are also of independent interest from the viewpoint of informal semantics of QHC.
To prepare both for the study of models in §4 and for discussions of informal semantics
in §3, we look at both formal and informal semantics of the meta-logic of QHC in §2.
The point of following section (§1.1) is to see how the subset/sheaf-valued models of
§4.4 arise naturally in elementary mathematics.
1.1. Algebraic equations
Let f : X → B be a continuous map (for instance, this could be a real polynomial
f : R → R or a complex polynomial f : C → C, f(x) = anxn + · · · + a0), and let us
consider the following parametric problem Γf(b), b ∈ B:
Find a solution of the equation f(x) = b.
Supported by The Fund for Math and Russian Foundation for Basic Research Grant No. 15-01-06302.
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If g : Y → B is another continuous map, then Γf(b) ∧ Γg(b) is the problem of finding
a solution of the system of equations{
f(x) = b
g(y) = b.
Similarly, Γf(b) ∨ Γg(b) is the problem of finding a solution of the union of equations1[
f(x) = b
g(y) = b.
(Thus the traditional signs { and [ can thought of as notationally representing the intu-
itionistic, and not classical, conjunction and disjunction, as long as we understand the
line containing an equation as implicitly asking one to find a solution of this equation.)
The proposition ?Γf(b) reads:
The equation f(x) = b has a solution,
This is a parametric proposition with parameter b running over B; in other words, a
unary predicate on B. Its truth value |?Γf | is the set of all b ∈ B for which ?Γf (b) is
true. This set is nothing but f(X).
The truth value of the conjunction ?Γf ∧ ?Γg is the intersection f(X)∩ g(Y ); and the
truth value of the disjunction ?Γf ∨ ?Γg is the union f(X) ∪ g(X).
Each point-inverse f−1(b) can be identified with the set of solutions of Γf (b) (this
identification amounts to the hypothesis of “functional extensionality”).
The solutions of Γf(b) ∨ Γg(b) are the elements of f−1(b) ⊔ g−1(b), which are in turn
identified with the solutions of Γf⊔g(b), where f ⊔ g denotes the obvious map to B from
the disjoint unionX⊔Y . The solutions of Γf(b)∧Γg(b) are the elements of f−1(b)×g−1(b),
which are in turn identified with the solutions of Γf×g(b), where f×g denotes the obvious
map to B from the fiberwise product X ×B Y = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | f(x) = g(y)}.
Thus we can make the following identifications of the problems with parameter b
running over B:
Γf ∧ Γg = Γf×g and Γf ∨ Γg = Γf⊔g.
Let us note that if f and g happen to be sheaves of sets, then f × g and f ⊔ g are their
usual product and coproduct.
We see that, in our setting of parametric equations, ? has the effect of converting
categorical notions into set-theoretic ones: the image of the product map, f × g, is the
intersection f(X) ∩ g(Y ); and the image of the coproduct map, f ⊔ g, is the union
f(X) ∪ g(X). In more syntactic terms,
|?Γf×g| = |?(Γf ∧ Γg)| = |?Γf ∧ ?Γg| = |?Γf | ∩ |?Γg|;
|?Γf⊔g| = |?(Γf ∨ Γg)| = |?Γf ∨ ?Γg| = |?Γf | ∪ |?Γg|.
1The square bracket notation for union of equations (and union of systems of equations) is commonly
used in some cultures, e.g. in Russia and Ukraine (for instance, when dealing with absolute value
equations, equations reducible to the form f(x)g(x) = 0, etc.).
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Now let us consider the parametric problem Γg(b) → Γf (b) of reducing the equation
f(x) = b to the equation g(y) = b. What is a solution of this problem, and when
does one exist? One thing is immediately clear: if there is a reduction of f(x) = b
to g(y) = b, and the latter equation has a solution, the former must also have one;
in symbols, ?
(
Γg(b) → Γf(b)
) → (?Γg(b) → ?Γf (b)). Let us note, however, that the
implication “if f(x) = b has a solution, then so does g(x) = b” is a vacuous condition
if f and g are complex polynomials of nonzero degree (since both equations necessarily
have solutions by the fundamental theorem of algebra). But this does not mean that it
is meaningless to ask which polynomial equations reduce to which.
Indeed, everybody knows how to solve the quadratic equation x2 + px = b. Upon
rewriting it in the form (x+ p
2
)2− p2
4
= b we see that it reduces to the equation y2− p2
4
= b,
which is suddenly easy to solve. Here y = x + p
2
, but the actual reduction of the
former equation to the latter one is given by the substitution x = y − p
2
, whose result
(y − p
2
)2 + p(y − p
2
) = b “miraculously” lacks the linear term. In general, an equation
f(x) = b reduces trivially to any equation of the form f(ϕ(y)) = b: by finding a solution
y0 of the latter equation, we immediately obtain the solution x0 = ϕ(y0) of the former
one. To find a substantial reduction, one seeks to rewrite the given equation f(x) = b
in the form g(ψ(x)) = b so that the equation ψ(x) = y can be solved for x; this solution
yields the desired function ϕ = ψ−1.2
Abstracting from the algebraic setting, let us say that a reduction of the parametric
equation f(x) = b to the parametric equation g(y) = b assigns to every solution y0 of the
latter one a solution x0 of the former one, by an assignment ϕ that depends continuously
on b. (In the example above, ϕ does not depend on b at all.) Thus it is a family of maps
g−1(b) → f−1(b) depending continuously on b; or, in other words, a continuous map ϕ
making the following diagram commute:
Y X
B
g
ϕ
f
However, if we return to our quadratic equation x2+px = b, we have only seen that it
reduces to y2− p2
4
= b. To solve the latter, we would first reduce it to the linear equation
z − p2
4
= b via the substitution y = ±√z, and then the linear equation can be solved
directly. Here the reducing “function” ϕ = ψ−1 is multivalued and, if we work over R,
only partially defined.3 Thus if b > p
2
4
, the quadratic equation has no real solutions,
so in this case we do not really have any reduction of the quadratic equation to the
2 An illustration of the power of this method is Vieta’s solution of the cubic equation x3+ax2+ cx = b.
Firstly, the substitution x = y − a
3
reduces it to the form y3 + py + q = b. Secondly, the substitution
y = z− p
3z
results in the equation z3+ q− p3
27z3
= b, as long as z 6= 0. Thirdly, the substitution z = 3√w
yields a reduction to the equation w+ q− p3
27w
= b, which upon multiplication by w becomes quadratic
(and so can be solved as above).
3Vieta’s last substitution, z = 3
√
w, is also multivalued if we work over C.
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linear one (which has one solution for all b). If b < p
2
4
, the quadratic equation has two
solutions, so we actually have two distinct reductions in this case.
Thus algebraic substitutions actually yield reductions only locally. Hence, let us say
that a local reduction of f(x) = ∗ to g(y) = ∗ is a continuous map from the preimage
g−1(U) of some open set U ⊂ B into f−1(U) making the following diagram commute:
g−1(U) f−1(U)
U.
g
ϕ
f
For example, our quadratic equation has two local reductions to the linear equation over
R, both defined over U = (−∞, p2
4
); they are given by y =
√
z and y = −√z.
Now just like the parametric problems Γf ∧ Γg and Γf ⊔ Γg, the implication between
the problem forms Γg → Γf must be a parametric problem. We can now define a solution
of (Γg → Γf )(b) to be the germ ϕb at b of a local reduction ϕ of f(x) = ∗ to g(y) = ∗,
defined over some neighborhood U of b.
If Hom(g, f)b denotes the set of all such germs ϕb at a fixed point b ∈ B, there is a natu-
ral topology on
⋃
b∈B Hom(g, f)b, where a neighborhood of ϕb is given by the germs ϕb′ for
all b′ ∈ U , where U is a neighborhood of b. The map Hom(g, f) : ⋃b∈B Hom(g, f)b → B,
ϕb 7→ b, is known as the sheaf of germs of maps Y → X over B, and we conclude that
the problem form Γg → Γf can be identified with ΓHom(g,f).
Now there seems to be a little issue with this definition. There is the trivial equation
y = b, corresponding to the case Y = B, g = id: B → B. If the problem Γid of finding a
solution of this trivial equation is really a trivial problem, then any problem Γf should
be equivalent to the problem Γid → Γf of reducing the equation f(x) = b to the trivial
equation y = b. But Hom(id, f) is also known as the sheaf of germs of sections of the
map f , and ΓHom(id,f) is inequivalent to Γf already for polynomial f , either complex (due
to multiple roots) or real (due to roots of even multiplicity); see [1; Example ??] for the
details.
Our approach to this issue is that it is not the definition of reduction between para-
metric problems that is not quite right, but the very formulation of our problem Γf . In
fact, if we replace it by the problem ∆f := ΓHom(id,f), the issue disappears. In closed
terms, the problem ∆f(b) asks to find only stable solutions of the equation f(x) = b,
that is, such x0 ∈ X that f(x0) = b and there exists a neighborhood U of b in B over
which f has a section (that is, a map s : U → X such that the composition U s−→ X f−→ B
equals the inclusion map U →֒ B).
What has been said above about parametric problems of the form Γf carries over to
those of the form ∆f ; the result is nothing but a special case of the subset/sheaf-valued
models of §4.4.
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2. Semantics of the meta-logic
What follows is a review of [1] as applied to the setup of QHC, and also some minor
elaborations on it.
2.1. Tarski-style semantics
The types 0, 1c, 1i and µ are interpreted by sets풟, 풪c, 풪i and 풬. A map ? : 풬 → {‚,‚}
is fixed.
The reflection operators !c : 1c → µ and !i : 1i → µ are interpreted by maps !c : 풪c → 풬
and !i : 풪i → 풬. The meta-connectives are interpreted by maps |&|, |⇒| : 풬×풬 → 풬; the
first-order meta-quantifier by a map |q| : Hom(풟,풬)→ 풬; and the second-order meta-
quantifiers by |qni | : Hom(Hom(풟n,풪i),풬)→ 풬 and |qnc | : Hom(Hom(풟n,풪c),풬)→ 풬.
The conversion operators are interpreted by maps |!| : 풪c → 풪i and |?| : 풪i → 풪c.
Binary connectives are interpreted by maps |∧|, |∨|, |→| : 풪i × 풪i → 풪i (intuitionistic)
and |∧|, |∨|, |→| : 풪c × 풪c → 풪c (classical); unary by maps |¬| : 풪i → 풪i (intuitionistic)
and |¬| : 풪c → 풪c (classical); and nullary by elements |⊤|, |⊥| ∈ 풪i and |X|, |×| ∈ 풪c.
Intuitionistic quantifiers are interpreted by maps |∀|, |∃| : Hom(풟,풪i)→ 풪i and classical
by maps |∀|, |∃| : Hom(풟,풪c)→ 풪c, where Hom(X, Y ) denotes the set of maps X → Y .
The above is called a meta-interpretation of the language of QHC. When 풬 = {‚,‚},
? is the identity map, and the meta-connectives and meta-quantifiers are interpreted ac-
cording to the usual truth tables, the meta-interpretation is called two-valued, or simply
an interpretation. Interpretations are, in a certain sense, models of the meta-logic (for
a more precise formulation see [1; §??]). In the present paper, we use only interpre-
tations to study formal semantics of QHC. However, for motivational purposes we will
also employ a certain “natural” contentual semantics of QHC (described in §2.6 below),
which is based on a many-valued meta-interpretation. It should also be noted that some
realizability-type “models” of intuitionistic logic are in fact meta-interpretations and not
interpretations (see [1; §??]).
We recall that an n-formula is a λ-expression of the form x1, . . . , xn 7→ F , where F
is a formula and x1, . . . , xn are pairwise distinct individual variables. A λ-expression
of the form p1, . . . , pl, γ1, . . . , γm 7→ G, where G is an n-formula, p1, . . . , pl are pairwise
distinct predicate variables of (not necessarily distinct) arities q1, . . . , ql and γ1, . . . , γm
are pairwise distinct problem variables of not (necessarily distinct) arities r1, . . . , rm,
is called an (n, ~q, ~r)-formula, where ~q = (q1, . . . , ql) and ~r = (r1, . . . , rm). It can also
be called an (n, ~q, ~r)-c-formula or an (n, ~q, ~r)-i-formula if G is an n-c-formula or an n-
i-formula. One can similarly define n-meta-formulas, which are of type 0n → µ, and
A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC & CLASSICAL LOGICS. II: SEMANTICS 6
(n, ~q, ~r)-meta-formulas, which are of type
0n × (0q1 → 1)× . . .× (0ql → 1)× (0r1 → 1)× . . .× (0rm → 1)→ µ,
where ~q = (q1, . . . , ql) and ~r = (r1, . . . , rm).
Given a meta-interpretation, a λ-closed (n, ~q, ~r)-c-formula F is interpreted by a straight-
forward recursion by a map |F | : 풟n×Hom(풟~q,~r,풪)→ 풪c, where Hom(풟~q,~r,풪) denotes
Hom(풟q1 ,풪c)× . . .× Hom(풟ql ,풪c)× Hom(풟r1 ,풪i)× . . .× Hom(풟rm ,풪i),
where ~q = (q1, . . . , ql) and ~r = (r1, . . . , rm). Similarly, a λ-closed (n, ~q, ~r)-i-formula Φ
is interpreted by a map |Φ| : 풟n × Hom(풟~q,~r,풪) → 풪i. Using this, a λ-closed (n, ~q, ~r)-
meta-formula F is interpreted by a map |F| : 풟n × Hom(풟~q,~r,풪i)→ 풬.
In particular, every λ-closed meta-formula F is interpreted by an element |F| ∈ 풬. A
λ-closed meta-formula F is called valid in a given meta-interpretation if ?(|F|) = ‚. If
D is a derivation system of QHC, an interpretation M of the language of QHC is called
a model of QHC if the λ-closed meta-formula D is valid in M .
2.2. Valuations and valuation fields
A valuation 퓋 assigns an element 퓋(p) ∈ Hom(풟n,풪c) to each n-ary predicate variable
p, and an element 퓋(γ) ∈ Hom(풟n,풪i) to each n-ary problem variable γ, for each
n = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Given a valuation 퓋, every closed c-formula F is interpreted by an
element |F |퓋 ∈ 풪c, every closed i-formula Φ by an element |Φ|퓋 ∈ 풪i, and every closed
meta-formula F by an element |F|퓋 ∈ 풬.
An assignment 퓊 assigns an element 퓊(x) ∈ 풟 to each individual variable x. Given
a valuation 퓋 and an individual assignment 퓊, every c-formula F is interpreted by an
element |F |퓋
퓊
∈ 풪c, every i-formula Φ by an element |Φ|퓋퓊 ∈ 풪i, and every meta-formula
F by an element |F|퓋
퓊
∈ 풬.
Given a meta-interpretation of the language of QHC, let us consider a family H of
subsets Hcn ⊂ Hom(풟n,풪c) and Hin ⊂ Hom(풟n,풪i), n = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The family H is
called a valuation field if it is closed with respect to the interpretations of connectives,
quantifiers and the conversion operators. A valuation 퓋 is said to be contained in H if
퓋(p) ∈ Hcn and 퓋(ϕ) ∈ Hin for every n-ary predicate variable p and every n-ary problem
variable ϕ, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The valuation field generated by a valuation 퓋, denoted 〈퓋〉,
is the smallest valuation field that contains 퓋. Clearly, 〈퓋〉 = (Hcn,Hin), where each Hcn
consists of all |F |퓋 such that F is an n-c-formula, and each Hin consists of all |Φ|퓋 such
that Φ is an n-i-formula.
Given an interpretation of the language of QHC, its restriction over a valuation
field H is obtained by re-interpreting the second-order meta-quantifiers by functions
|qnc | : Hom(Hcn,풬
)→ 풬 and |qni | : Hom(Hin,풬)→ 풬 defined in the same way as before,
i.e. by |qnc |(f) =
‚
if and only f(p) =
‚
for all p ∈ Hcn and by |qni |(f) =
‚
if and only
f(ϕ) =
‚
for all ϕ ∈ Hin. Interpretations restricted over valuation fields are, in a certain
sense, models of the meta-logic (for a more precise formulation see [1; §?? and §??]). An
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interpretation restricted over a valuation field H is called a model of QHC with respect
to H if some derivation system D of QHC is valid in the restricted interpretation.
2.3. Clarified BHK interpretation
Kolmogorov’s problem interpretation of intuitionistic logic [5] explains not only logical,
but, in disguise, also meta-logical connectives and quantifiers in the same language of
solutions of problems. The logical part was discussed in [2; §??], and the meta-logical
part will be discussed now.
In fact, we will follow a slight modification of Kolmogorov’s original interpretation,
called the “clarified” or (in extended form discussed below) “meta-clarified” BHK inter-
pretation in [1]. Namely, Kolmogorov’s interpretation of, say, ⊢ γ ∨ ¬γ is that it is “the
problem of finding a general method of solving the problem Γ ∨ ¬Γ for every contentful
(e.g. mathematical) problem Γ”. But in our approach, the informal meta-meta-logic of
judgements about formal derivations in the meta-logic is classical; and it does not seem
to be appropriate to interpret such judgements by problems.
Thus according to the clarified BHK interpretation,
(1) the principle ·γ∨¬γ is interpreted by the very same (meta-)problem mentioned
above, the problem of finding a general method of solving the problem Γ∨¬Γ for
every contentful problem Γ;
(2) the judgement ⊢ ·γ ∨ ¬γ asserting that the latter principle is derivable is inter-
preted by the judgement  ·γ ∨ ¬γ that the said meta-problem has a solution.
Let us note that either version includes a constructive quantification (“general method”)
over all concrete problems. This does not seem to be compatible with usual, Tarski-style
model theory, which only deals with classical quantification (e.g. over all valuations).
However, it is compatible with meta-interpretations as defined above, including some
specific ones, such as uniform realizability [1; §??].
2.4. Kolmogorov’s semantic consequence
All interpretations considered above are either traditional, “Tarski-style” interpretations,
which are based, in particular, on Tarski’s concept of semantic consequence; or meta-
interpretations, which can be called “generalized Tarski-style”.
We will next do something radically different, and consider alternative, “Kolmogorov-
style” interpretations and meta-interpretations, which are based, in particular, on Kol-
mogorov’s concept of semantic consequence, which is also found in his problem interpre-
tation of intuitionistic logic [5].
Kolmogorov’s problem interpretation uses the same language of solutions of problems
to explain both logical and (in disguise) meta-logical connectives and quantifiers. It is
this coincidence of 풪 and 풬 that makes Kolmogorov’s concept of semantic consequence
particularly apposite to his context.
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Here is Kolmogorov’s interpretation of the modus ponens rule,
ϕ,ϕ→ ψ
ψ
,
in the zero-order case which he considered. We will break it into steps, which will be pre-
sented using our meta-logical notation; but upon eliminating the notation it is essentially
Kolmogorov’s original interpretation (see [1; §??] for a more detailed discussion).
(1) The above rule is interpreted as the problem of finding a general method of
solving a certain problem
|·Φ & ·Φ→ Ψ ⇒ ·Ψ|
for any given formulas Φ and Ψ.
(2) A solution of the latter problem is in turn a general method of converting any
given solutions of |·Φ| and |·Φ→ Ψ| into a solution of |·Ψ|.
(3) In the zero-order case, ·Φ, ·Ψ and ·Φ → Ψ are abbreviations for ⟮~γ⟯Φ, ⟮~γ⟯Ψ
and ⟮~γ⟯Φ→ Ψ, where ~γ = (γ1, . . . , γm) is the tuple of all problem variables that
occur in Φ and Ψ. A solution of e.g. |⟮γ⟯Φ| is a general method of solving the
contentful problem |~γ 7→ Φ|(~Γ) for any tuple ~Γ = (Γ1, . . . ,Γm) of contentful (e.g.
mathematical) problems.
(4) What is a solution of |~γ 7→ Φ|(~Γ), or |~γ 7→ Ψ|(~Γ), or |~γ 7→ Φ→ Ψ|(~Γ) is deter-
mined by the usual BHK interpretation (see [2; §??]).
Kolmogorov offered similar interpretations also for two other rules, and clearly this
approach applies to an arbitrary rule just as well, including those in first-order logic (see
details in [1; §??]). Thus we will speak of Kolmogorov’s interpretation of rules.
An obvious issue with Kolmogorov’s interpretation of rules is that it applies what in
essence is constructive quantification (“general method”) to syntactic entities (“for any
given formulas”), thereby creating a dangerous mix of syntax and semantics.
But it turns out that this mix of syntax and semantics can be disentangled. What is
important in Kolmogorov’s interpretation of rules is that the formulas being quantified
over (such as Φ and Ψ in the above example) are treated as functions of the problem
variables ~γ (and in the first order case also of the individual variables ~x). But such a
functional dependence can well be modelled on the semantic level.
2.5. Alternative semantics
Here we adopt the alternative interpretation of the meta-logic [1; §??] (see also further
details in [1; §??]) to the setup of QHC. The notation is somewhat different from that
in [1; §??] (more natural, but less concise).
If N is a finite set of individual variables, a semantic N-term is a function T : 풟#N →
풟, where #N denotes the cardinality of N . A semantic term is an element (N, T ) of
the disjoint union |풯| := ⊔N∈U∗ Hom(풟#N ,풟), where U is the set of all individual
variables and U∗ is the set of its finite subsets.
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If additionallyM c is a finite set of predicate variables andM i is a finite set of problem
variables, and x stands for either c or i, a semantic (N,M c,M i, k)-x-formula is a function
Φ: 풟#N×Hom(풟#Mc,#M i,풪)→ Hom(풟k,풪x), where#Mx denotes the vector of arities
of the elements of Mx. A semantic k-x-formula is an element (N,M c,M i,Φ) of the dis-
joint union |ℱxk | :=
⊔
(N,Mc,M i)∈U∗×Vc∗×V
i
∗
Hom
(
풟#N×Hom(풟#Mc,#Mi,풪),Hom(풟k,풪x)
)
,
where Vc is the set of all predicate variables, V i is the set of all problem variables, and Vx∗
is the set of all finite subsets of Vx. We will also denote |ℱcq1|×. . .×|ℱcql|×|ℱir1 |×. . .×|ℱirm |
by |ℱ~q,~r|, where ~q = (q1, . . . , ql) and ~r = (r1, . . . , rm).
Given a λ-closed atomic (n, ~q, ~r)-meta-formula G = ~p, ~γ 7→ (~x 7→ !F ), where ~q =
(qq, . . . , ql) and ~r = (r1, . . . , rm), its alternative interpretation will be a map G :
|ℱ~q,~r| → Hom(|풯|n,풬), defined as follows. Let us start from the usual Tarski-style
interpretation |G| : Hom(풟~q,~r,풪) → Hom(풟n,풬). Given an n-tuple ~T of semantic
Ni-terms Ti : 풟
#Ni → 풟, we can combine them into a map T : 풟#N → 풟n, where
N = N1 ∪ · · · ∪Nn. Given an l-tuple ~F of semantic (Lj ,M cj ,M ij , qj)-c-formulas
Fj : 풟
#Lj × Hom(풟#Mcj ,#M ij ,풪)→ Hom(풟qj ,풪c)
and an m-tuple ~Φ of semantic (L˜k, M˜
c
k , M˜
i
k, rk)-i-formulas
Φk : 풟
#L˜k × Hom(풟#M˜ck ,#M˜ ik ,풪)→ Hom(풟rk ,풪i),
we can combine them into a map
F × Φ: 풟#L × Hom(풟#Mc,#M i,풪)→ Hom(풟~q,~r,풪),
where L = L1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ll ∪ L˜1 ∪ . . . L˜m, M c = M c1 ∪ · · · ∪ M cl ∪ M˜ c1 ∪ · · · ∪ M˜ cm and
M i = M i1 ∪ · · · ∪ M il ∪ M˜ i1 ∪ · · · ∪ M˜ im. Finally, |G|, T and F × Φ combine into a
map 풟#(L∪N) × Hom(풟#Mc,#M i,풪) → 풬, which we will denote, somewhat loosely, by
|G| ◦ (~T × ~F × ~Φ). We can apply to this map the Tarski-interpreted #(L ∪ N)-fold
first-order and (#M c,#M i)-fold second-order meta-quantifier
|q#Mc,#M i#(L∪N) | : Hom
(
풟
#(L∪N) ×Hom(풟#Mc,#M i,풪),풬)→ 풬
and obtain an element |q#Mc,#M i#(L∪N) |
(|G|◦(~T× ~F×~Φ)) ∈ 풬. Thus we have described a map
G : |ℱ~q,~r| → Hom(|풯|n,풬). Let us note that the Tarski-interpreted meta-quantifiers
|q|, |qnc | and |qni | are used here to interpret ! rather than any meta-quantifiers.
Next, we keep the Tarski-style interpretations & := |&| and ⇒ := |⇒| for the meta-
connectives, whereas the first-order meta-quantifier q is re-interpreted by a function
q : Hom(|풯|,풬) → 풬; and the n-ary second-order meta-quantifiers qnc , qni are re-
interpreted by functions qnc : Hom(|ℱcn |,풬)→ 풬 and qni : Hom(|ℱin|,풬)→ 풬.
The above will be called the alternative meta-interpretation associated to the given
Tarski-style meta-interpretation. In the case of a Tarski-style interpretation (i.e. two-
valued meta-interpretation), we can define an alternative interpretation by providing
explicit definitions of the functions q , qnc and q
n
i . Namely, we set q (f) =
‚
if and
only f(T ) =
‚
for all T ∈ |풯|, qnc (f) =
‚
if and only f(F ) =
‚
for all F ∈ |ℱcn | and
qni (f) =
‚
if and only f(Φ) =
‚
for all Φ ∈ |ℱin|.
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Given an alternative meta-interpretation, we can interpret any λ-closed (n, ~q, ~r)-meta-
formula G by a function G : |ℱ~q,~r| → Hom(|풯|n,풬) by a straightforward induction. In
particular, any λ-closed meta-formula F is interpreted by an element F ∈ 풬.
2.6. Intended informal semantics
This is based on the alternative interpretation of the meta-logic and combines the “meta-
clarified BHK interpretation” of intuitionistic logic [1; §??] with the corresponding ver-
sion of the “Verificationist interpretation” of classical logic [1; Remark ??].
풪c is taken to be a class of propositions, containing a prescribed class of contentful
(e.g. mathematical) primitive propositions, and 풪i is taken to be a class of problems,
containing a prescribed class of contenful (e.g. mathematical) primitive problems. Com-
posite propositions and composite problems are obtained inductively from the primitive
ones by using contentual classical and intuitionistic connectives and 풟-indexed quanti-
fiers, as well as the contentual conversion operators |!| : 풪c → 풪i, |!|(P ) = “Prove P ”, and
|?| : 풪i → 풪c, |?|(Γ) = “Γ has a solution”. The connectives, quantifiers and conversion
operators of QHC are interpreted straightforwardly by their contentual analogues.
풬 is taken to be a class of problems containing the class 풪i of “meta-primitive” prob-
lems. Thus the function !i : 풪i → 풬 is the inclusion; and the function !c : 풪c → 풬 is
the composition 풪c
|!|−→ 풪i !i−→ 풬. “Meta-composite” problems are obtained inductively
from the meta-primitive ones by using contentual intuitionistic connectives and quan-
tifiers over arbitrary 풟-indexed, Hom(풟n,풪i)-indexed (n = 0, 1, . . . ), Hom(풟
n,풪c)-
indexed (n = 0, 1, . . . ), |풯|-indexed, |ℱin|-indexed (n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ) and |ℱcn |-indexed
(n = 0, 1, 2, . . . ) families of problems. Meta-connectives and meta-quantifiers are Tarski-
interpreted by contentual intuitionistic connectives and풟-indexed, Hom(풟n,풪i)-indexed
and Hom(풟n,풪c)-indexed quantifiers in the straightforward way; also, meta-quantifiers
are alternatively interpreted by contentual intuitionistic |풯|-indexed, |ℱin|-indexed and
|ℱcn |-indexed quantifiers.
The function ? : 풬 → {‚,‚} sends a problem Γ to ‚ if and only if there exists a
solution of Γ. What is meant by “solving” a problem Γ is defined explicitly for primitive
Γ ∈ 풪i; also, “truth” is defined explicitly for primitive propositions P ∈ 풪c. Then these
notions are extended inductively to composite P ∈ 풪c and Γ ∈ 풪i by means of the usual
truth tables and the usual BHK interpretation, along with two additional clauses: |?|(Γ)
is set to be “true” if and only if Γ has a solution; and to “solve” |!|(P ) means to prove
that P is true. Finally, what is meant by “solving” a problem is further explained for all
meta-composite Γ ∈ 풬 by the usual BHK-interpretation. This determines a contentual
interpretation of QHC and its meta-logic, which we will call the intended interpretation.
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2.7. Modified informal semantics
As noted above, Kolmogorov’s interpretations of principles and rules are not compatible
with the usual Tarski-style theory. But there is a simple workaround. The follow-
ing modified semantics overcomes this incompatibility by replacing the informal (i.e.,
contentual) constructive quantifier discussed in §2.3 above with a combination of an
informal classical quantifier (enabling compatibility with standard model theory) and a
potentially formal constructive quantifier (preventing intuitionistic logic from degener-
ating into classical). It is a straightforward combination of the “Verificationist” version
(see [1; §??]) of the “modified Platonist interpretation” of classical logic [1; §??] and the
“modified BHK interpretation” of intuitionistic logic [1; §??].
In addition to a domain of discourse풟, we fix a “hidden parameter” domain ℰ. Now 풪c
is taken to be a class of unary predicates on ℰ, containing a prescribed class of contentful
(e.g. mathematical) primitive predicates, and 풪i is taken to be a class of problems with
parameter in ℰ, containing a prescribed class of contentful (e.g. mathematical) primitive
parametric problems. Composite predicates and composite parametric problems are ob-
tained inductively from the primitive ones by using contentual classical and intuitionistic
connectives and 풟-indexed quantifiers, as well as the contentual conversion operators
|!| : 풪c → 풪i, (|!|P )(e) = “Prove P (e)”, and |?| : 풪i → 풪c, (|?|Γ)(e) = “Γ(e) has a so-
lution”. The connectives, quantifiers and conversion operators of QHC are interpreted
straightforwardly by their contentual analogues.
The value of !i : 풪i → 풬 = {‚,‚} on a parametric problem Γ ∈ 풪i will be ‚ if and
only if there exists a general method of solving the problem Γ(e) for all e ∈ ℰ. The
function !c : 풪c → 풬 is defined as the composition 풪c |!|−→ 풪i !i−→ 풬. (Thus the value of !c
on a predicate P ∈ 풪c is ‚ if and only if there exists a general method of proving that
P (e) is true for all e ∈ ℰ, i.e., the passage from classical logic to classical meta-logic is
through constructive logic.)
Here “truth” for P (e) is defined explicitly for primitive P ∈ 풪c and all e ∈ ℰ, and
what is meant by “solving” Γ(e) is defined explicitly for primitive Γ ∈ 풪i and all e ∈ ℰ
(separately for each e ∈ ℰ). Then these notions are extended inductively to composite
P ∈ 풪c and Γ ∈ 풪i (separately for each e ∈ E) by means of the usual truth tables and
the usual BHK interpretation, along with two additional clauses: (|?|Γ)(e) is set to be
“true” if and only if Γ(e) has a solution; and to “solve” (|!|P )(e) means to prove that
P (e) is true. This determines a contentual interpretation of QHC and its meta-logic,
which we will call the modified interpretation.
3. Principles
3.1. H- and K-Principles
3.1.1. Hilbert’s Non Ignorabimus Principle. Hilbert [3] (see also [1; §??]) prefaced his
famous problem list with an expression of his “conviction” that
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“every definite mathematical problem must necessarily be susceptible of an exact settle-
ment, either in the form of an actual answer to the question asked, or by the proof of
the impossibility of its solution and therewith the necessary failure of all attempts”.
Thus in the terminology of [2; ??], he presumably asserted semi-decidability of all prob-
lems, given that he hardly intended to imply a general method [3]:
“This conviction of the decidability of every mathematical problem is a powerful incentive
to the worker. We hear within us the perpetual call: There is the problem. Seek its
solution. You can find it by pure reason, for in mathematics there is no ignorabimus4.”
Hilbert reiterated his conviction 25 years later, with the “perpetual call” repeated ver-
batim, and with the following addition [4]:
“Now, to be sure, my proof theory cannot specify a general method for deciding every
mathematical problem; that does not exist. But the demonstration5 that the assumption
of the decidability of every mathematical problem is consistent falls entirely within the
scope of our theory.”
In QHC, problems are represented by i-formulas, and so we will refer to the principle of
decidability for i-formulas, ·?(γ ∨ ¬γ) as “Hilbert’s Non Ignorabimus Principle”, or the
H-principle for brevity. The principle of semi-decidability for i-formulas, ·?(α ∨ ¬α),
is equivalent to the principle of semi-stability for i-formulas, ·?(¬¬α → α), using that
·¬¬(α ∨ ¬α) is derivable in intuitionistic logic (see [1; (??)]).
A further argument in favour of the H-principle is that an i-formula of the form6
!F is semi-decidable as long as the c-formula F satisfies either of Heyting’s “definitive”
judgement combinations (see [2; §??]):
(i) ⊢ F (or, equivalently, ⊢ ?!F );
(ii) ⊢ ¬F (or, equivalently, ⊢ ?!¬F );
(iii) ⊢ ¬F and ⊢ ¬¬F (or, equivalently, ⊢ ?¬!F and ⊢ ?¬!¬F );
(iv) ⊢ ¬¬F and ⊢ ¬¬¬F (or, equivalently, ⊢ ?¬¬!F and ⊢ ?¬¬!¬F ).
Indeed, ⊢ ?!F → ?(!F ∨¬!F ), and also ⊢ ?!¬F −→ ?¬¬!¬F and ⊢ ?¬¬!¬F −→ ?¬!F
and ⊢ ?¬!F −→ ?(!F ∨ ¬!F ).
An argument against the H-principle is that while it is quite reasonable to expect
that any given problem either has a solution, or can be proved (in some sense) to have
no solutions — there is no reason to expect that the proof in question will always be
expressible in a given formal system. Yet this might well be required by the H-principle,
4Hilbert presumably refers to the Latin maxim ignoramus et ignorabimus (literally “we do not know
and shall not know”, in the sense “[there are things] man can never know”), and with it also likely to
the then-famous position in the philosophy of science, articulated by the physiologist Emil du Bois-
Reymond (a brother of the mathematician Paul du Bois-Reymond) in his 1872 address to the German
Scientific Congress entitled “U¨ber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens” (“On the limits of our understanding
of nature”) and in a number of later speeches and writings.
5This announced demonstration, which was to be “the first and most important step” in Hilbert’s
attempted proof of the Continuum Hypothesis, seems to have never appeared. Hilbert’s paper contains
a precise formulation of what he meant by “decidability of every mathematical problem” only in “the
part that is of relevance here”, which concerned elimination of a choice operator in formal proofs.
6In fact, there is no loss of generality here in considering only i-formulas of this form (see 3.6 below).
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depending on how one interprets ! (which is implicit in the intuitionistic ¬). (From this
viewpoint, Heyting’s “definitive” combinations are not really any more definitive than
the other ones, including the empty combination.)
It should be noted also that the ♦-translation (see [2; §??]) of ·?(α∨¬α) is ·¬?¬(α∨
¬α), which is derivable in QHC (since so is ·¬¬(α ∨ ¬α)).
3.1.2. Kolmogorov’s Stability Principle. Often a mathematical problem is formulated,
either explicitly or implicitly, as Prove or disprove P , where P is a proposition — which
amounts to !P ∨ !¬P in our notation. This is quite different from Hilbert’s problem of
“exact settlement”, which in the case of the problem Γ = !P specializes to !P ∨ ¬!P . In
fact, any independent statement yields an example of the difference (see [1; §??]).
However, in some cases of interest there is no difference. For example, let Q(n) denote
the arithmetical predicate “2n is a sum of two primes”. (Thus ∀nQ(n) is Goldbach’s
conjecture, the example whose discussion by Heyting and Kolmogorov was reviewed in
[2; §??].) Then by checking all primes ≤ 2n we can either prove or disprove Q(n);
thus Q(n) is decidable: ⊢ ∀n(!Q(n) ∨ !¬Q(n)). Using this, it is easy to see that for
P := ¬∀nQ(n), the negation of Goldbach’s conjecture, there is no difference between
!¬P and ¬!P . Indeed, !¬P is in this case the problem !∀nQ(n) of proving Goldbach’s
conjecture; if restate it equivalently as ∀n !Q(n), it requests us to find a general method
of proving Q(n) for each n. We actually do have such a general method (namely, checking
all primes ≤ 2n), except that we do not really know if it always works. But it certainly
cannot fail if we assume ¬!P , that is, ¬!¬∀nQ(n). In more detail, the latter problem is
equivalent to ¬!∃n¬Q(n), which by (!
→
) implies ¬∃n !¬Q(n), which is in turn equivalent
(see [2; (??)]) to ∀n¬!¬Q(n). But given that our checking procedure also solves the
problem ∀n (!Q(n) ∨ !¬Q(n)), from this we get a solution of ∀n !Q(n) — the desired
proof of Goldbach’s conjecture.
What this argument really shows is that not only Goldbach’s conjecture, but every
arithmetical Π01 proposition
7 (and still more generally, every universally quantified de-
cidable proposition) is stable — that is, for its negation P there is no difference between
!¬P and ¬!P (see [2; §??] concerning stable propositions).
Remark 3.1. Kent found an arithmetical formula F such that in Peano Arithmetic,
⊢ F → Bew(F ), where Bew is Go¨del’s provability predicate, but F is not equivalent in
Peano Aritmetic to any Σ01 formula (see [7; 4.3.2]). If we let G := G∧Bew(#G) (see [2;
§??]), then ⊢ F → F , or equivalently ⊢ ♦¬F → ¬F , which in turn implies ⊢ ♦¬F →
¬F . (The latter is equivalent to the stability of ¬F , see [2; §??].) Thus in a certain
arithmetical model of QS4, not all stable propositions are Π01 propositions. Beware that
QS4 is not complete with respect to this model, which satisfies the independent principle
Grz of QS4 (see [1; §??]).
7For instance, the usual formulation of Fermat’s last theorem is another example of an arithmetical Π0
1
proposition; Riemann’s hypothesis and the Poincare conjecture are known to be equivalent to arith-
metical Π0
1
propositions by nontrivial but elementary results.
A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC & CLASSICAL LOGICS. II: SEMANTICS14
As discussed in [2; §??], an opinion expressed by Kolmogorov in his letter to Heyting
may be interpreted as asserting that in a constructive framework, every sentence must be
either a problem or a stable proposition. Since in QHC, propositions are represented by c-
formulas, we will use the title of “Kolmogorov’s Stablity Principle”, or the K-principle, for
the principle of stability for c-formulas, ·¬!¬p→ !p, — or, equivalently (see [2; ??(a)]),
the principle of semi-stability for c-formulas, ·?(¬!¬p→ !p).
3.1.3. Equivalent forms. We will use the following notation from [2; §??]: D,S : 1i → 1i
are defined by α 7→ α ∨ ¬α and α 7→ ¬¬α → α respectively; and D,S : 1c → 1i are
defined by p 7→ !p ∨ !¬p and p 7→ ¬!¬p→ !p respectively.
Proposition 3.2. (a) The K-principle is equivalent to · !¬p↔ ¬!p.
(b) The H-principle is equivalent to ·?¬α↔ ¬?α.
This follows directly from [2; ??].
Proposition 3.3. (a) The H-principle is equivalent to ·∇α↔ ¬¬α.
(b) The K-principle implies ·∇α↔ ¬¬α.
Proof. By the classical law of double negation, ⊢ ∇α ↔ !¬¬?α. Assuming the K-
principle, we have · !¬¬?α↔ ¬¬∇α; and assuming the H-principle, we have · !¬¬?α↔
∇¬¬α. In either case, by [2; ??], ⊢ ∇¬¬α↔ ¬¬α and ⊢ ¬¬α↔ ¬¬∇α. Thus in both
cases we obtain ·∇α↔ ¬¬α.
It remains to prove that ·∇α ↔ ¬¬α implies the H-principle: ·∇(α ∨ ¬α). But on
assuming ·∇β ↔ ¬¬β, the latter gets identified with the intuitionistically derivable
principle ·¬¬(α ∨ ¬α) (see [1; (??)]). 
Proposition 3.4. The following principles and rules are equivalent:
(i) the K-principle;
(ii)
♦p
p
;
(iii) ·p↔ p;
(iv) ·(p ∨ q) ←→ (p ∨q);
(v) ·?D(p).
As usual, ♦p is an abbreviation for ¬¬p.
Proof. We will establish the implications (i)⇒(ii)⇒(iii)⇒(iv)⇒(v)⇒(i).
From (i) we easily have ·?¬!¬p→ ?!p. On the other hand, using that the K-principle
implies the H-principle, we can permute ? and ¬. Thus we obtain ·¬?!¬p → ?!p, or
·♦p→ p. Since ⊢ p→ p, this in particular implies the rule (ii).
Next, it is well-known and easy to check the following in QS4 (and hence in QHC):
(1) ⊢ p→ ♦p;
(2) ⊢ ♦♦p→ ♦p;
(3) ⊢ (♦p→ ♦q)→ ♦(p→ q).
A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC & CLASSICAL LOGICS. II: SEMANTICS15
From (3) we have ⊢ (♦♦q → ♦q) → ♦(♦q → q). Consequently, from (2) and modus
ponens we get ⊢ ♦(♦q→ q). Assuming the rule (ii), we infer from this ·♦q→ q. This
amounts to ·p→ p, by substituting ¬p for q (and ¬q for p).
The principle (iv) trivially follows from (iii).
The law of excluded middle for c-formulas entails ⊢ (p ∨ ¬p), which together with
the principle (iv) yields ·p ∨¬p. Then from (?∨) we get ·?(!p ∨ !¬p); that is, (v).
Finally, semi-decidability implies semi-stability using that ⊢ α ∨ β→ ¬β→ α. 
Remark 3.5. (a) It is also easy to get (ii) from (iii): If ·p → p, then ·♦q → q, by
substituting ¬q for p.
(b) Here is a direct derivation of (v) from (i). Assuming the K-principle, by the above
we have · !¬p ↔ ¬!p and the H-principle: ·?(α ∨ ¬α). Thus we get ·?(!p ∨ ¬!p), and
consequently ·?(!p ∨ !¬p).
Proposition 3.6. The following are equivalent:
(1) the H-principle;
(2) ·?D(∇α);
(3) ·S(∇α);
(4) ·?S(∇α).
Here “∇α” can clearly be replaced by “ !p”. By [2; ??] and [2; ??], it can also be
replaced by “?α”. This can be in turn replaced by “p”.
Proof. (4) is trivially equivalent to ·∇(¬¬∇α→ ∇α), which by [2; ??(a)] is equivalent
to ·¬¬∇α→∇α, i.e., (3). Now by [2; ??], (3) is equivalent to ·¬¬α→∇α. By 3.3(a),
the latter is in turn equivalent to (1).
On the pother hand, by [2; ??], (2) is equivalent to ·?D(?α). By [2; ??(b)], the latter
is equivalent ·?D(α), i.e., (1). 
Proposition 3.7. The following are equivalent forms of the H-principle:
(1) ·p↔ ♦p;
(2) ·p↔ ♦p.
As noted in [2; §??], the K-principle is equivalent to ·♦p → p; by the above, it is
also equivalent to ·p↔ p.
Proof. The principle (1) is clearly equivalent to ·?α ↔ ♦?α, or ·?α ↔ ¬?!¬?α. This
implies · !?α ↔ !¬?!¬?α; in fact, this implication is reversible, by applying ? to both
sides. Thus (1) is equivalent to ·∇α↔ ¬¬α, a form of the H-principle.
By 3.6 and the subsequent remark, the H-principle is equivalent to ·S(p); that is,
to ·¬!¬p → !p. By [2; ??], this is equivalent to · !¬?!¬p → !p. The latter implies
·?!¬?!¬p→ ?!p; in fact, this implication is reversible, by applying ! to both sides. Thus
the H-principle is equivalent to ·♦p→ p. The converse to the latter principle holds
in QHC (in fact, already in QS4): ⊢ p→ ♦p due to ⊢ q→ ♦q. 
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Let us note that one of the latest forms of the H-principle, ·♦p→ p, is equivalent
to ·♦q ↔ ♦q by substituting ¬q for p (or ¬p for q) and taking the contrapositive.
The latter is a law of the modal logic QS5, whose other laws can be taken to be those
of QS4. This yields
Corollary 3.8. QHC extended by the H-principle is a conservative extension of QS5.
Proof. Since the -interpretation of QHC in QS4 is the identity on QS4, it descends to
an interpretation of QHC extended by the H-principle in QS5 that is the identity on
QS5. 
Proposition 3.9. (a) The H-principle is equivalent to ·?(α→ β) ←→ (?α→ ?β).
(b) The K-principle is equivalent to · !(p→ q) ←→ (!p→ !q).
(a). It suffices to show that ·?¬α ↔ ¬?α is not only a special case of ·?(α → β) ↔
(?α→ ?β), but also implies it.
Indeed, by the classical double negation law, ?(α→ β) rewrites as ¬¬?(α→ β); and
assuming that ? commutes with ¬, we can further rewrite it as ¬?¬(α → β). By an
intuitionistic validity (see [1; (??)]), the latter can be rewritten as ¬?(¬¬α ∧ ¬β); and
by (?∧), the latter amounts to ¬(?¬¬α ∧ ?¬β). Once again using our assumption, we
can rewrite the latter as ¬(¬¬?α ∧ ¬?β). Validities of classical logic simplify this into
?α→ ?β, as desired. 
(b). Assuming ·p → p, we get · !(p → q) ↔ (!p → !q) from [2; ??(a)]. Conversely,
· !(p→ q)↔ (!p→ !q) specializes to · !¬p↔ ¬!p. 
3.2. Extraction principles
• Proof Constructivity Principle (PC-principle): ·∇α→ α.
Informally, there is a method to extract from a proof of solubility of some
problem an actual solution of that problem.
• Reducibility Principle (R-principle): · (∇α→ ∇β) −→ ∇(α→ β).
Informally, there is a method to extract from a reduction of a proof of solubility
of one problem to a proof of solubility of another problem a proof of an actual
reducibility of the first problem to the second one.
• Disambiguation Principle (D-principle): ·∇(α ∨ β) −→ (∇α ∨ ∇β).
Informally, there is a method to extract from a proof of solubility of at least one
of two problems an explicit choice of one of these two problems whose solubility
it actually proves.
• Proof Constructivity Rule (PC-rule): ∇α
α
.
Informally, there is a method to find, for each formula Φ, a method to extract
from a proof of solubility (by a general method) of all problems instantiating Φ
an actual solution (by a general method) of all those problems.
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Remark 3.10. Let us note that if either ⊢ ?Φ or ⊢ ¬?Φ, then ⊢ ?(∇Φ→ Φ). (Indeed, by
[2; ?? and ??], ⊢ ¬?Φ implies ⊢ ?¬∇Φ.) Similarly, if Φ is an i-formula such that ?Φ is
either provable or disprovable in some theory T over QHC, then T proves ?(∇Φ→ Φ).
Proposition 3.11. The meta-conjunction of the R-principle and the PC-rule is equiv-
alent to the PC-principle.
Proof. Clearly, ·α↔ ∇α implies the R-principle and PC-rule.
Conversely, ·∇(α → β) ↔ (∇α → ∇β) implies, by substituting ∇β for α, the
principle ·∇(∇β→ β), which on applying the PC-rule yields ·∇β→ β. 
Proposition 3.12. (a) The K-principle is equivalent to ·(p→ q) ←→ (p→ q).
(b) The H-principle implies the R-principle, · (∇α→∇β) −→ ∇(α→ β).
Proof. (a). ·p↔ p trivially implies ·(p→ q)↔ (p→ q).
Conversely, ·(p → q) ↔ (p → q) implies · (p → q) → (p → q). Substitut-
ing p for q in the latter, we get ·p→ p. 
(b). By applying ! to both sides of ·?(α → β) ↔ (?α → ?β), we get ·∇(α → β) ↔
!(?α→ ?β), and the assertion follows from [2; ??(a)]. 
Proposition 3.13. (a) The PC-rule,
∇α
α
, is equivalent to
?α
α
.
(b) The K-principle,
♦p
p
, is equivalent to
¬!p
¬p .
It should be noted that the second rule in (a) is the converse to (?⊤); and the second
rule in (b) is the converse to the rule form of (!⊥) in [2; ??(b)].
Proof. This is due to the reversibility of (!⊤) and of the rule form of (?⊥) in [2; ??(a)]. 
Proposition 3.14.
(a) The following are equivalent forms of the R-principle:
. ·∇(α→ β) ←→ (∇α→ ∇β)
. · !?(α→ β) ←→ !(?α→ ?β);
. ·?(α→ β) ←→ (?α→ ?β);
. ·?(α→ β) ←→ ?(∇α→ ∇β);
. ·∇(α→ β) ←→ ∇(∇α→ ∇β).
(b) The following are equivalent forms of the D-principle:
. ·∇α ∨∇β ←→ ∇(α ∨ β)
. · !?α ∨ !?β ←→ !(?α ∨ ?β);
. · !p ∨ !q ←→ !(p ∨q);
. · !p ∨ !q ←→ ∇(!p ∨ !q);
. ·∇α ∨∇β ←→ ∇(∇α ∨∇β).
It is easy to see that the “→” implication in each line is derivable in QHC. In fact,
the “→” in (a), # is equivalent to (?→) by using [2; ??(a)] (to see that it implies (?→),
it suffices to use (?!)); and the “→” in (b), # is equivalent to (!∨) by using (?!).
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Proof. (a). By [2; ??(a)], the right hand sides of # and # are equivalent to each other;
and the right hand sides of # and # are equivalent to each other. By applying ? to
both sides of #, we obtain #; conversely, by applying ! to both sides of #, we recover
#. Similarly, by applying ! to both sides of #, we obtain #; and by applying ? to
both sides of #, we recover #. (Alternatively, the right hand side of # is equivalent
to that of # by [2; ??(e)].) 
(b). By (?∨), the right hand sides of # and # are equivalent to each other; and the
right hand sides of # and # are equivalent to each other. If we specialize # or #
by substituting !p for α and !q for β, we obtain # or #, respectively; conversely, if
we specialize # or # by substituting ?α for p and ?β for q, we recover # or #,
respectively. (Alternatively, the right hand side of # is equivalent to that of # by
[2; ??(b)].) 
Corollary 3.15. The R-principle is equivalent to the rule
?γ→ (?α→ ?β)
?γ→ ?(α→ β) .
A version of this rule appears in [1; §??] in connection with the implication clause of
the BHK interpretation. Let us note that the said rule is not admissible in QHC since
it is equivalent to a non-derivable (see §4 below) principle.
Proof. The rule in question may be equivalently rewritten by applying !’s to both the
premise and the conclusion. Using [2; ??(a)] (the strengthened version which is actually
proved), this can further be equivalently rewritten as
∇γ→ (∇α→∇β)
∇γ→∇(α→ β) .
The latter rule clearly follows from the R-principle. For the converse, let us substitute
∇α → ∇β for γ; then the premise is derivable by [2; ??(e)] and the conclusion is
equivalent to the R-principle by 3.14(a). 
Proposition 3.16.
(a) The following are equivalent forms of the H-principle:
. · (?!p→ ?!q) ←→ ?(!p→ !q);
. · (?α→ ?β) ←→ ?(∇α→ ∇β);
. · (?α→ ?β) ←→ (?α→ ?β);
. · (p→ q) ←→ (p→ q).
(b) The following are equivalent forms of the K-principle:
. ·(p ∨ q) ←→ p ∨q;
. ·?!(p ∨ q) ←→ ?(!p ∨ !q);
. · !(p ∨ q) ←→ ∇(!p ∨ !q);
. · !(p ∨ q) ←→ !(p ∨q);
. ·(p ∨ q) ←→ (p ∨q).
(c) The following are equivalent forms of the K-principle:
. ·(p→ q) ←→ (p→ q);
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. ·?!(p→ q) ←→ ?(!p→ !q);
. · !(p→ q) ←→ ∇(!p→ !q);
. · !(p→ q) ←→ !(p→ q);
. ·(p→ q) ←→ (p→ q).
It is easy to see that the “←” implication in each line of (a,b) and the “→” implication
in each line of (c) is derivable in QHC. In fact, the “←” in (b), # is equivalent to (!∨)
by using [2; ??(a)].
The following “missing” analogue of #’s is by [2; ??(a)] derivable in QHC:
⊢ (!p→ !q) ←→ !(p→ q).
Let us note that a special case of (a), #, ·¬p↔ ¬p, is essentially the same as
one of the previous forms of the H-principle, ·p↔ ♦p.
Proof. (a). The equivalences #⇔# and #⇔# are similar to 3.14(b). Also, by
[2; ??(a)], the right hand side of # is equivalent to that of #.
Now # specializes to ·¬?α↔ ¬?α, whereas ⊢ ¬?α ↔ ?¬α due to [2; ??]. Thus
# implies the H-principle.
Conversely, by 3.12(a), the H-principle implies the R-principle, which by 3.14(a) is
equivalent to ·?(α→ β)↔ ?(∇α→∇β). On the other hand, by 3.9(a), the H-principle
also implies ·?(α→ β)↔ (?α→ ?β). By combining these, we get #. 
(b). This is proved similarly to 3.14(a), using (?∨) to obtain the two equivalences of the
right hand sides. 
(c). The equivalence of # and # is similar to 3.14(a). The right hand side of # is
equivalent to that of # by [2; ??(c)], and to that of · !(p → q) ←→ (!p → !q) (yet
another form of the K-principle) by [2; ??(a)]. 
Proposition 3.17.
(a) The following are equivalent forms of the PC-principle, ·∇α↔ α:
. · (α→ β) ←→ !(?α→ ?β);
. ·α ∨ β ←→ !(?α ∨ ?β),
(b) The following are equivalent forms of the K-principle, ·p↔ p:
. · (p→ q) ←→ ?(!p→ !q);
. ·p ∨ q ←→ ?(!p ∨ !q).
Here the “→” implication in (a), # and the “←” implication in (b), # are equivalent
to (?∨) and (!∨) respectively by using [2; ??]. The “→” implication in (a), # is derivable
in QHC by the same token.
Proof. (a). By [2; ??(a)], # is equivalent to · (α → β) ↔ (∇α → ∇β). The latter
principle clearly follows from ·∇β↔ β; and also implies it by substituting X for α.
By (?∨), # is equivalent to ·α ∨ β↔ ∇(α ∨ β). The latter principle clearly follows
from ·∇α↔ α; and also implies it by substituting either α or × for β. 
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(b). Assuming ·p↔ p, # follows from 3.16(c), #. Conversely, by applying ! to both
sides of #, we obtain 3.16(c), #.
By (?∨), # is equivalent to ·p∨q↔ (p∨q). This clearly follows from ·p↔ p;
and also implies it by substituting either p or ⊥ for q. 
Proposition 3.18. (a) QHC extended by any collection of consequences of the PC-
principle, ·∇α↔ α, is conservative over QH and over QC.
(b) QHC extended by any collection of consequences of the K-principle, ·p ↔ p, is
conservative over QH and over QC.
Proof. The PC-principle (and any of its consequences) is validated in the-interpretation
of QHC in QS4, which is exact on both QH and QC.
The K-principle (and any of its consequences) is validated in the ¬¬-interpretation of
QHC in QH, which is exact on both QH and QC. 
3.3. Principles involving quantifiers
Proposition 3.19.
(a) The following are equivalent forms of the PC-principle, ·β↔∇β:
. ·∃xα(x) ←→ !∃x ?α(x);
. ·∀xα(x) ←→ !∀x ?α(x).
(b) The following are equivalent forms of the K-principle, ·q↔ q:
. ·∃xp(x) ←→ ?∃x !p(x);
. ·∀xp(x) ←→ ?∀x !p(x).
Here the “→” implications in (a) are equivalent to (?∃) and (?∀), and the “←” impli-
cations in (b) are equivalent to (!∃) and (!∀) respectively, by using [2; ??].
Proof. By using (?∃) and (!∀), we can rewrite each of the four principles in the form where
one side differs from another by a single  or ∇ (either before or after the quantifier).
Hence the principles in (a) immediately follow from ·β↔∇β, and the principles in (b)
from ·q ↔ q. The converse implications are obtained by substituting x 7→ β for α,
where β is a nullary problem variable, and x 7→ q for p, where q is a propositional (i.e.,
nullary predicate) variable. 
Proposition 3.20. The following are equivalent to the K-principle:
. ·∃xp(x) ←→ ¬?¬∃x !p(x);
. ·∀xq(x) ←→ ?∀x¬!¬q(x).
This essentially asserts the equivalence between formulas of classical logic and their
♦-translations (see [2; §??]).
Proof. # is equivalent to # by substituting ¬p for q (or ¬q for p), taking the con-
trapositive and using [1; (??)].
It is easy to see that the K-principle implies # (using that ! commutes with ∀ and,
on assuming the K-principle, with ¬, and that, on assuming the K-principle,  can be
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erased). Conversely, by substituting x 7→ r for q, where r is a propositional variable,
from # we get ·r↔ ?¬!¬r. Using that ⊢ ¬α↔ !¬?α, we can rewrite this as ·r↔ ♦r.
Yet ·♦r→ r is one of the forms of the K-principle. 
The principles of the following proposition follow trivially from either the K-principle,
in the form ·p ↔ p (in the case of (b) and (c)), or from the PC-principle, ·α ↔ ∇α
(in the case of (a) and (d)).
Proposition 3.21.
(a) The following are equivalent forms of the ∀∇-principle, ·∇∀xα(x) ←→ ∀x∇α(x):
. · !?∀xα(x) ←→ !∀x ?α(x);
. ·?∀xα(x) ←→ ∀x ?α(x);
. ·?∀xα(x) ←→ ?∀x∇α(x);
. ·∇∀xα(x) ←→ ∇∀x∇α(x).
(b) The following are equivalent forms of the ∃-principle, ·∃xp(x) ←→ ∃xp(x):
. ·?!∃xp(x) ←→ ?∃x !p(x);
. · !∃xp(x) ←→ ∇∃x !p(x);
. · !∃xp(x) ←→ !∃xp(x);
. ·∃xp(x) ←→ ∃xp(x).
(c) The following are equivalent forms of the ∀-principle, ·∀xp(x) ←→ ∀xp(x):
. ·∀x ?!p(x) ←→ ?∀x !p(x);
. ·∀x ?α(x) ←→ ?∀x∇α(x);
. ·∀x ?α(x) ←→ ∀x ?α(x);
. ·∀xp(x) ←→ ∀xp(x).
(d) The following are equivalent forms of the ∃∇-principle, ·∃x∇α(x) ←→ ∇∃xα(x):
. ·∃x !?α(x) ←→ !∃x ?α(x);
. ·∃x !p(x) ←→ !∃xp(x);
. ·∃x !p(x) ←→ ∇∃x !p(x);
. ·∃x∇α(x) ←→ ∇∃x∇α(x).
It is easy to see that the “→” implication in each line of (a,d) and the “←” implication
in each line of (b,c) is derivable in QHC. In fact, it is equivalent to the corresponding
law of QHC, (?∀) or (?∃) (by using [2; ??] in the cases of (a), # and (b), # and using
(!?) and (?!) in the cases of (c), # and (d), #).
Proof. (a,b). These are proved similarly to 3.14(a), using (!∀) and (?∃) respectively. 
(c,d). These are proved similarly to 3.14(b), using (!∀) and (?∃) respectively. 
Corollary 3.22. The ∀∇-principle is equivalent to the rule ?γ→ ∀x ?α(x)
?γ→ ?∀xα(x) .
A version of this rule appears in [1; §??] in connection with the universal quantifier
clause of the BHK interpretation. Let us note that the said rule is not admissible in
QHC since it is equivalent to a non-derivable (see §4 below) principle.
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The proof is similar to that of 3.15.
Each of the ∀-, ∃-, ∀∇- and ∃∇-principles is satisfied in every model of QHC with
singleton domain; therefore none of these principles implies any of the independent
quantifier-free principles.
Proposition 3.23. The H-principle implies the ∀-principle.
Proof. By the classical law of excluded middle, ⊢ ∃xr(x) ∨ ¬∃xr(x). On the other
hand, by 3.16(a), #, the H-principle implies ·¬q ↔ ¬q. Since ⊢ ∃xr(x) ↔
∃xr(x) [2; ??(c)], we get ·∃xr(x) ∨ ¬∃xr(x). The latter principle is classically
equivalent to ·¬∀x¬r(x) ∨∀x¬r(x), and hence to ·∀x¬r(x)→ ∀x¬r(x). The
latter specializes, by substituting ¬q(x) for r(x), to ·∀x♦q(x) → ∀x♦q(x), which in
turn specializes, by substituting p(x) for q(x), to ·∀x♦p(x) → ∀x♦p(x). By
applying again the H-principle in the form of 3.7, ·♦q ↔ q, we get ·∀xp(x) →
∀xp(x), i.e. the ∀-principle in the form of 3.21(c),#. 
Proposition 3.24. The ∃-principle implies the ∀-principle.
Proof. The ∃-principle implies, in particular, the rule
∃xq(x)
∃xq(x) .
We will show that this rule implies the ∀-principle, ·∀xp(x)→ ∀xp(x).
Let F (x) = ¬p(x)∨∀yp(y). Then ·∃xF (x) is equivalent to ·∃x¬p(x)∨∀yp(y),
which is in turn equivalent to ·¬∀xp(x) ∨ ∀xp(x) — a special case of the classical
law of excluded middle. Thus ·∃xF (x) is derivable in QS4. Our hypothesis then implies
·∃xF (x), or in more detail, ·∃x(¬p(x) ∨ ∀yp(y)). This can be rewritten as
·∃x(p(x) → ∀yp(y)), which in turn implies ·∃x (p(x) → ∀yp(y)). By an
intuitionistic validity (see [1; (??)]), the latter implies ·∀xp(x)→ ∀yp(y). This is
the same as ·∀xp(x)→ ∀xp(x), i.e. the ∀-principle in the form of 3.21(c),#. 
Proposition 3.25. The ∀-principle does not imply the ∃-principle.
Proof. Under the -interpretation, the two principles, when expressed using only  = ?!
(with no separate ?’s and !’s), turn into principles of QS4 expressed by the same formulas.
Every topological model of QS4 in an Alexandroff space satisfies the ∀-principle, in the
form ·∀xp(x)↔ ∀xp(x). The ∃-principle, in the form ·∃xp(x)↔ ∃xp(x),
fails, for instance, in a topological model in the Alexandroff space corresponding to the
poset N (with the usual order), with 풟 = N and with |p|(n) = {n}. 
Proposition 3.26. The ∀∇-principle and the ∃∇-principle do not imply one another.
Moreover, the D-principle implies neither the ∀∇-principle nor the ∃∇-principle.
Proof. The ¬¬-interpretation transforms the first two principles in question into the
¬¬-Shift Principle and the Strong Markov Principle (see [2]). But these do not imply
one another, as shown by Tarski models. Namely, the ¬¬-Shift Principle is satisfied
in the one-point compactification N+ of the countable discrete space, and fails in the
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Alexandroff space corresponding to the poset N; whereas the Strong Markov Principle
is satisfied in all Alexandroff spaces whose corresponding preorder is a directed set, and
fails in N+, since the union of the regular open sets {n}, n ∈ N, is not regular open (see
[1; §?? and §??]).
The second assertion follows since the ¬¬-translation transforms the D-principle into
an equivalent form of de Morgan’s principle, which does not imply the ¬¬-Shift Principle
since it is also satisfied in Alexandroff spaces whose corresponding preorder is a directed
set, and does not imply the Strong Markov Principle since it is satisfied in the Stone–Cˇech
compactification of N (whose existence depends on the uncountable axiom of choice), or
alternatively by analyzing an obvious model in the one-point compactification of N (see
[1; §?? and Proposition ??]). 
Remark 3.27. An alternative way to see that the ∀- and ∀∇-principles do not imply
the ∃- and ∃∇-principles is by considering two-element domains, over which the former
principles hold, since ∧ commutes with  and ∇, and the latter principles generally do
not hold, since ∨ generally does not commute with either  or ∇ (by Theorem 4.4).
3.4. Intuitionistically unacceptable principles
All independent principles of intuitionistic logic discussed in this section can be found
in [1; §??], which includes Tarski topological models that prove their independence.
Proposition 3.28. Assume the H-principle. Then:
(a) the PC-rule,
∇α
α
, is equivalent to the problem decidability principle (i.e. ·α∨¬α);
(b) the ∀∇-principle is equivalent to the ¬¬-Shift Principle;
(c) the ∃∇-principle is equivalent to the Strong Markov Principle.
Since the K-principle is conservative over intuitionistic logic and implies the H-principle,
we obtain that the K-principle does not imply either the ∀∇- or the ∃∇-principle.
Proof. Parts (b) and (c) follow since the H-principle is equivalent to ·∇α ↔ ¬¬α. To
get (a), we additionally use that the H-principle implies the principle ·∇(α → β) ↔
(∇α → ∇β), whose meta-conjunction with ∇α/α is equivalent to ·∇α ↔ α. Thus on
assuming the H-principle, ∇α/α is equivalent to ·α↔ ¬¬α, which is in turn equivalent
to ·α ∨ ¬α (see [1; (??) and (??)]). 
Proposition 3.29. Assume the PC-principle. Then:
(a) the ∀-principle implies the Constant Domain Principle;
(b) the ∃-principle implies the Principle of Independence of Premise.
Since the PC-principle is conservative over intuitionistic logic, we obtain that the
PC-principle does not imply either the ∀- or the ∃-principle.
Proof. (a). By 3.21(c), the ∀-principle is equivalent to ·∀x ?α(x) ↔ ?∀x∇α(x), which
in the presence of ·∇α↔ α simplifies to ·∀x ?α(x)↔ ?∀xα(x).
A GALOIS CONNECTION BETWEEN INTUITIONISTIC & CLASSICAL LOGICS. II: SEMANTICS24
Since the Constant Domain Principle holds classically, we have
⊢ !∀x (?α ∨ ?β(x)) ←→ !(?α ∨ ∀x ?β(x)).
Here the left hand side is equivalent by (!∀) and (?∨) to ∀x !?(α ∨ β(x)), which in the
presence of ·∇α ↔ α simplifies to ∀x (α ∨ β(x)). On the other hand, α ∨ ∀xβ(x) can
be rewritten in the presence of ·∇α↔ α as !?(α∨ ∀xβ(x)), which by (?∨) is equivalent
to !(?α ∨ ?∀xβ(x)). Collecting the previous steps, we get that the Constant Domain
Principle, ·∀x (α ∨ β(x)) −→ α ∨ ∀xβ(x), is equivalent (in the presence of the PC-
principle) to · !(?α ∨ ∀x ?β(x)) −→ !(?α ∨ ?∀xβ(x)); and the assertion follows. 
(b). By 3.21(b), the ∃-principle is equivalent to · !∃xp(x) ↔ ∇∃x !p(x), which in the
presence of ·∇α↔ α simplifies to · !∃xp(x)↔ ∃x !p(x).
Since the Principle of Independence of Premise holds classically, we have
⊢ !(?α→ ∃x ?β(x)) ←→ !∃x (?α→ ?β(x)).
Here the left hand side is equivalent by (?∃) and [2; ??(a)] to !?α→ !?∃xβ(x), which in
the presence of ·∇α↔ α simplifies to α→ ∃xβ(x). On the other hand, ∃x (α→ β(x))
can be rewritten in the presence of ·∇α↔ α as ∃x (!?α→ !?β(x)), which by [2; ??(a)] is
equivalent to ∃x !(?α→ ?β(x)). Collecting the previous steps, we get that the Principle
of Independence of Premise, · (α → ∃xβ(x)) −→ ∃x (α → β(x)), is equivalent (in the
presence of the PC-principle) to · !∃x (?α → ?β(x)) −→ ∃x !(?α → ?β(x)); and the
assertion follows. 
Proposition 3.30. (a) The principle · !∃xp(x) ←→ ∃x !p(x)
. is equivalent to the conjunction of the ∃- and ∃∇-principles; and
. implies the Generalized Markov Principle.
(b) The principle ·?∀xα(x) ←→ ∀x ?α(x)
. is equivalent to the conjunction of the ∀- and ∀∇-principles; and
. implies the Parametric Distributivity Principle.
The Parametric Distributivity Principle,
·¬∀y (α(y) ∨ ∀xβ(x, y)) −→ ¬∀y ∀x (α(y) ∨ β(x, y)),
introduced in [1; Example ??], is a variation of a principle of Kleene; each of the two
principles is a double negation of a two-variable generalization of the Constant Domain
Principle (whereas the double negation of the one-variable Constant Domain Principle
is intuitionistically derivable).
Proof. #’s. We will check (b), #; an entirely similar argument proves (a), #. We
have, in bare QHC calculus, ⊢ ?∀xα(x) −→ ?∀x∇α(x) and ⊢ ?∀x∇α(x) −→ ∀x ?α(x),
and by 3.21(a,c), the reverse implications are precisely the ∀- and ∀∇-principles. Thus
the meta-conjunction of the latter principles is equivalent to ·∀x ?α(x) −→ ?∀xα(x).
But the converse to the latter is nothing but the law (?∀). 
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Proof. (a), #. By [2; ??] and (?∀) we have in QHC ⊢ ¬∀xα(x) ←→ !¬?∀xα(x)
and ⊢ !¬?∀xα(x) −→ !¬∀x ?α(x). Since the Generalized Markov Principle holds
classically, we also have ⊢ !¬∀x ?α(x) −→ !∃x¬?α(x). From the hypothesis we also get
· !∃x¬?α(x) −→ ∃x !¬?α(x). Finally, ⊢ ∃x !¬?α(x) ←→ ∃x¬α(x) by [2; ??]. Thus,
using the hypothesis, we have obtained ·¬∀xα(x) → ∃x¬α(x), the Generalized Markov
Principle. 
(b), #. Since the Parametric Distributivity Principle holds classically, we have
⊢ !¬∀y (?α(y) ∨ ∀x ?β(x, y)) −→ !¬∀y ∀x (?α(y) ∨ ?β(x, y)).
Since ? commutes with ∨ and, by the hypothesis, with ∀, we get
· !¬?∀y (α(y) ∨ ∀xβ(x, y)) −→ !¬?∀y ∀x (α(y) ∨ β(x, y)).
Finally, by [2; ??] the latter is equivalent to the Parametric Distributivity Principle. 
Proposition 3.31.
(a) The following are equivalent:
. · !(p ∨ q) ←→ !p ∨ !q;
. ·D(p);
. the meta-conjunction of the K-principle, ·(p ∨ q) ↔ p ∨ q, and the D-
principle, ·∇(α ∨ β)↔ ∇α ∨ ∇β;
. the meta-conjunction of the K-principle and Jankov’s principle, ·¬α ∨ ¬¬α.
(b) The following are equivalent:
. ·D(∇α);
. the meta-conjunction of the H-principle and the D-principle;
. the meta-conjunction of the H-principle and Jankov’s principle.
As noted above (see 3.6), ·D(∇α) is equivalent to ·D(p).
Beware that while ·D(∇α) is a special case of ·α∨¬α, the principle ·D(p) does not
follow from it (using the model of 4.5 below).
Proof. (b). By [2; ??], # is equivalent to ·∇α ∨ ¬α. By [2; ??], ⊢ ∇α→ ¬¬α. Hence
# implies ·¬¬α ∨ ¬α.
On the other hand, ·D(∇α) implies ·?D(∇α), which by 3.6 is equivalent to the H-
principle. Thus # implies #.
Conversely, assuming the H-principle, we have ·∇α ↔ ¬¬α, and our derivation of
·¬¬α ∨ ¬α from # can be reversed.
Finally, assuming the H-principle, we also have that ·∇(α ∨ β) ←→ ∇α ∨ ∇β is
equivalent to ·¬¬(α ∨β) ←→ ¬¬α ∨¬¬β. But the latter is equivalent to ·¬α∨¬¬α
(see [1; ??]). 
(a). #⇔#. If we specialize · !(p ∨ q) → !p ∨ !q by substituting ¬p for q, we obtain
· !p ∨ !¬p using the classical law of excluded middle.
Conversely, since ! commutes with ∧, and (p∨q)∧¬p is intuitionistically equivalent to
q∧¬p, we have ⊢ !(p∨q)∧!¬p↔ !q∧!¬p. In particular, we obtain ⊢ !(p∨q)∧!¬p→ !q.
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By the exponential law, this rewrites as ⊢ !(p ∨ q)→ (!¬p→ !q). This is easily seen to
yield ⊢ !(p ∨ q) → (!p ∨ !¬p → !p ∨ !q). A double application of the exponential law
transforms this into ⊢ !p ∨ !¬p→ (!(p ∨ q)→ !p ∨ !q). 
#⇔#. This is proved similarly to 3.30, using 3.14(b) and 3.16(b). 
#⇔#. This is similar to (b), using that the K-principle implies the H-principle. 
3.5. ED-principle
The following Exclusive Disambiguation Principle (ED-principle):
·¬(α ∧ β) −→ (∇(α ∨ β)→∇α ∨∇β)
is motivated by the observations that (i) ∇Γ has a solution if and only if Γ does (in
fact, ⊢ ?∇γ↔ ?γ in QHC), and that (ii) ∇Γ = !(?Γ) can have at most one solution
according to Lafont’s argument (see [1; §??]). Indeed, by (i), ∇Γ∨∇∆ has a solution if
and only if ∇(Γ ∨∆) does; whereas by (ii), ∇Γ ∨∇∆ can have at most one solution as
long as ∇Γ ∧∇∆ is known to have no solutions. By (i), the latter assumption amounts
to Γ ∧ ∆ having no solutions. Now under some circumstances, knowing existence and
uniqueness of a solution could amount to the knowledge of that solution itself.
Clearly, the D-principle, ·∇(α ∨ β) ←→ (∇α ∨ ∇β), implies the ED-principle.
Proposition 3.32. The following are equivalent forms of the ED-principle:
(i)
¬(α ∧ β)
∇(α ∨ β)→∇α ∨ ∇β ;
(ii) ·∇((α ∧ ¬β) ∨ (β ∧ ¬α)) −→ ∇α ∨∇β.
Proof. By the exponential law, the ED-principle is equivalent to ·¬(α∧β)∧∇(α∨β) −→
∇α∨∇β. To see that the latter is equivalent to (ii), let us note that by [2; ?? and ??],
¬(α ∧β) ∧∇(α∨β) is equivalent to ∇((α∨β)∧¬(α ∧β)). By [1; (??) and (??)], the
latter is in turn equivalent to ∇
((
α∧ (α→ ¬β))∨ (β∧ (β→ ¬α))), and the assertion
follows.
Now, the ED-principle implies (i) using the modus ponens. To see that (i) implies
(ii), we substitute Φ := γ ∧ ¬δ for α and Ψ := δ ∧ ¬γ for β, and observe that ⊢
¬((γ∧¬δ)∧ (γ∧¬δ)). Hence (i) implies ·∇(Φ∨Ψ)→ ∇Φ∨∇Ψ, which in turn implies
(ii) using that ⊢ ∇(γ ∧ ¬δ) ∨ ∇(δ ∧ ¬γ)→∇γ ∨ ∇δ. 
Proposition 3.33. (a) Jankov’s principle, ·¬α ∨ ¬¬α, implies the ED-principle.
(b) ·D(∇α) is equivalent to the meta-conjunction of the H- and ED-principles.
(c) ·D(p) is equivalent to the meta-conjunction of the K- and ED-principles.
Proof. (a). Let us recall that ·¬γ ∨ ¬¬γ implies de Morgan’s principle ·¬(γ ∧ δ) →
¬γ ∨ ¬δ (the converse of an intuitionistically derivable principle), see [1; ??]. Thus it
suffices to show that the formula ¬α∨¬β→ (∇(α∨β)→∇α∨∇β) is derivable in QHC.
By the exponential law, it is equivalent to ∇(α ∨ β)→ (¬α ∨ ¬β→∇α ∨∇β). By [1;
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(??)], the latter is equivalent to ∇(α∨β)→ (¬α→∇α∨∇β)∧(¬β →∇α∨∇β), which
by [1; (??)] is in turn equivalent to F ∧G, where F = ∇(α ∨ β) → (¬α → ∇α ∨ ∇β)
and G = ∇(α ∨ β) → (¬β → ∇α ∨ ∇β). Here F is equivalent, using the exponential
law and [2; ??], to ∇(α∨β) ∧∇¬α→∇α∨∇β. The latter is equivalent, using [2; ??]
and [1; (??)], to ∇((α ∧ ¬α) ∨ (β ∧ ¬α))→ ∇α ∨∇β. This is derivable in QHC, since
⊢ ∇(β∧¬α)→∇β. Similarly, G is also derivable in QHC, and the assertion follows. 
(b). One implication follows from (a) and 3.31(b). Conversely, the H-principle implies,
in particular, ·?D(∇γ), that is, ·∇(∇γ ∨ ¬∇γ). Substituting ∇γ and ¬∇γ for α and
β in the ED-principle and using [2; ??], we get ·∇γ ∨ ¬∇γ, i.e., ·D(∇γ). 
(c). One implication follows from 3.31(a). The converse is parallel to (b). In more
detail, by 3.4, the K-principle is equivalent to ·?D(p), that is, ·∇(!p ∨ !¬p). We have
⊢ !p ∧ !¬p ↔ !(p ∧ ¬p) and ⊢ !(p ∧ ¬p) → !⊥ and ⊢ !⊥ ↔ ×. Hence, by substituting
!p and !¬p for α and β in the ED-principle, we get · !p ∨ !¬p, i.e., ·D(p). 
4. Models
4.1. Interior-based models
By composing the -interpretation of QHC (see [2]) with a topological model of QS4
(see [1; §??]), we obtain an interior-based model of QHC. In relatively self-contained
terms, such a model can be described as follows:
• We fix a topological space X and a domain of discourse 풟.
• The intuitionistic side is interpreted as in the Tarski model (see [1; §??]) in open
subsets of X.
• The classical side is interpreted as in the Leibniz–Euler model (see [1; §??]) in
arbitrary subsets of X.
• |?Φ| = |Φ|, and |!F | = Int |F |.
Even though ? is interpreted by the identity, it need not commute with → or with ∀
in an interior-based model, since the interpretations of intuitionistic → and ∀ do not
coincide with the restrictions of the interpretations of classical → and ∀. Indeed, the
interpretations of intuitionistic → and ∀ can be expressed in terms of those of classical
→ and ∀ due to the validity of the following principles in all interior-based models:
· (α→ β) ←→ !(?α→ ?β);
·∀xα(x) ←→ !∀x ?α(x).
It should be noted that each of these two principles is equivalent to the PC-principle,
·∇α↔ α (see 3.17(a) and 3.19(a)).
Now that we have a model of the QHC calculus, we obtain
Theorem 4.1. The QHC calculus is consistent.
It is easy to see that in an interior-based model, decidable propositions are represented
by clopen sets, and stable propositions by sets S such that Int Cl S = IntS (these include
closed sets as well as regular open sets).
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4.2. Regularization-based models
By composing the ¬¬-interpretation of QHC (see [2]) with a Tarski model of QH (see [1;
§??]), we get a regularization-based model of QHC. A relatively self-contained description
is as follows:
• We fix a topological space X and a domain of discourse 풟.
• The intuitionistic side is interpreted as in a Tarski model in open sets of X.
• The classical side is interpreted in regular open sets of X, via the ¬¬-translation.
• |!F | = |F |, and |?Φ| = Int(Cl |Φ|).
In other words, |?Φ| = |¬¬Φ|. On the classical side we have, in more detail:
• |p|(x1, . . . , xn) is a regular open set for each n-ary predicate variable p;
• |F ∧G| = |F | ∩ |G|;
• |∀xH(x)| = Int⋂x |H(x)|;
• |¬F | = Int(X \ |F |);
• other classical connectives reduce to ∧, ∀ and ¬; namely,
• |F ∨G| = IntCl(|F | ∪ |G|);
• |∃xH(x)| = IntCl⋃x |H(x)|;
• |F → G| = Int ((X \ |F |) ∪ |G|);
• |⊤| = X and |⊥| = ∅,
where F and G are c-formulas and H is a 1-c-formula, and 퓊 and 퓋 are fixed.
Even though ! is interpreted by the identity, it need not commute with ∨ or with ∃
in a regularization-based model, since the interpretations of classical ∨ and ∃ do not
coincide with the restrictions of the interpretations of intuitionistic ∨ and ∃. Indeed, the
interpretations of classical ∨ and ∃ are expressible in terms of those of intuitionistic ∨
and ∃ due to the validity of the following principles in all regularization-based models:
·p ∨ q ←→ ?(!p ∨ !q);
·∃xp(x) ←→ ?∃x !p(x).
It should be noted that each of these two principles is equivalent to the K-principle,
·p↔ p (see 3.17(b) and 3.19(b)).
Let us note that ♦ corresponds to the closure operator in interior-based models of QHC
(or in topological models of QS4), and the subset Int Cl(IntS) of a topological space is
precisely the smallest regular open set containing the open set Int S. It follows from
this that the ♦-interpretation A 7→ A♦ (see [2; §??]) “pulls back” a regularization-based
model out of every interior-based model:
Proposition 4.2. Every interior-based modelM determines a regularization-based model
M♦ as follows: the interpretation of a formula A of QHC in M♦ is |A|M♦ := |A♦|M .
Remark 4.3. By [2; Theorem ??], ⊢ A implies ⊢ A♦ if A is a formula of QHC. This meta-
judgement cannot be internalized. Indeed, A ⊢ A♦ would imply that principles satisfied
in interior-based models are also satisfied in regularization-based models — which is not
the case, as we will see in Theorem 4.4.
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4.3. Examination of principles
Theorem 4.4. (a) The R-principle is valid in all interior-based models and in all
regularization-based models.
(b) The PC-, D- and ED-principles; the PC-rule; and the ∀∇- and ∃∇-principles are
valid in all interior-based models but not valid in some regularization-based models.
(c) The K- and H-principles and the ∀- and ∃-principles are valid in all regularization-
based models but not valid in some interior-based models.
Proof. By the results of §3, the principles listed in (a) and (b) all follow from ·α↔∇α,
which is clearly valid in all interior-based models; whereas the principles listed in (a)
and (c) all follow from p↔ p, which is clearly valid in all regularization-based models.
Thus it remains to check the negative assertions, of which those on the D- and K-
principles can be omitted, since they imply respectively the ED- and H-principles.
In the presence of the K-principle, which is valid in all regularization-based models,
the PC-principle is equivalent to the PC-rule, which is in turn equivalent to ·α ∨ ¬α;
the D- and ED-principles are equivalent to ·¬α ∨ ¬¬α; and the ∀∇- and ∃∇-principles
are equivalent respectively to the ¬¬-Shift Principle and the Strong Markov Principle.
But each of these is not valid in some Tarski model of QH (see [1; §??]), which in turn
extends to a regularization-based model of QHC.
Similarly, in the presence of the PC-principle, which is valid in all interior-based
models, the H-principle is equivalent to ·α ∨ ¬α; and the ∀- and the ∃-principles
imply respectively the Constant Domain Principle and the Principle of Independence of
Premise. But each of these is not valid in some Tarski model of QH (see [1; §??]), which
in turn extends to an interior-based model of QHC. 
Proposition 4.5. (a) The H-principle implies neither the K-principle nor the ∃-
principle.
(b) The D-principle, ·∇(α ∨ β)↔ ∇α ∨ ∇β, does not imply the PC-rule, ∇α
α
.
Proof. (a). Let us consider an interior-based model on R with respect to the valuation
field where all problem variables are interpreted by ∅ or R on every input, and all
predicate variables are interpreted by∅ or Q or R\Q or R on every input. (This is possible
since both Q and R\Q have empty interior.) Since all problems are interpreted trivially,
the H-Principle (e.g. in the form ·∇α↔ ¬¬α) is valid. But the interior operator is
nontrivial, so the K-Principle (e.g. in the form ·p↔ p) is not valid. The ∃-principle
also fails, e.g. by considering a two-element domain. 
(b). Let us consider the regularization-based model on the two-element poset 0 < 1,
viewed as an Alexandroff space. The regularization of the open set {1} is the entire
space, {0, 1}, so ∇α 6 α. On the other hand, using that the only regular open sets are
∅ and {0, 1}, it is easy to check that  ∇(α ∨ β)↔∇α ∨ ∇β. 
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Remark 4.6. The PC-rule implies the PC-principle (and in particular the weaker D-, ∀∇-
and ∃∇-principles) both in interior-based models and in regularization-based models,
because all of them satisfy the R-principle (see 3.11).
4.4. Subset/sheaf-valued models
A subset/sheaf-valued structure interpreting the language of QHC is described as follows.
(i) We fix a topological space B and a domain of discourse 풟.
(ii) The intuitionistic side is interpreted as in a sheaf-valued model of [1; §??] over
B. Thus, nullary problem variables are interpreted by sheaves (of sets) over B;
nary problem variables by families of sheaves indexed by Dn; and intuitionistic
connectives and quantifiers by the usual operations on sheaves:
• |Φ ∨Ψ| = |Φ| ⊔ |Ψ|;
• |Φ ∧Ψ| = |Φ| × |Ψ|;
• |Φ→ Ψ| = Hom(|Φ|, |Ψ|);
• |×| = Char∅;
• |∃xΞ(x)| = ⊔d∈D |Ξ|(d);
• |∀xΞ(x)| =∏d∈D |Ξ|(d),
where Φ and Ψ are i-formulas and Ξ is a 1-i-formula, and 퓊 and 퓋 are fixed.
Also, if Φ is an n-i-formula,  Φ means that each sheaf in the family of sheaves
|Φ| has a global section.
(iii) The classical side is interpreted as in a Leibniz–Euler model (see [1; §??]) — in
arbitrary subsets of B. Thus:
• |F ∨G| = |F | ∪ |G|;
• |F ∧G| = |F | ∩ |G|;
• |¬F | = X \ |F |;
• |F → G| = (X \ |F |) ∪ |G|;
• |∃xH(x)| = ⋃d∈D |H|(d);
• |∀xH(x)| = ⋂d∈D |H|(d),
where F and G are c-formulas and H is a 1-c-formula, and 퓊 and 퓋 are fixed.
Also, if F is an n-c-formula,  F means that each subset in the family of subsets
|F | coincides with X.
(iv) |!F | = χInt |F |, the sheaf provided by the inclusion Int |F | →֒ B.
(v) |?Φ| = Supp |Φ|, the set of all b ∈ B such that the stalk |Φ|b 6= ∅.
In exactly the same way we define subset/presheaf-valued structures. The only es-
sential difference between subset/sheaf- and subset/presheaf-valued structures is in the
interpretations of intuitionistic ∨ and ∃, due to the fact that σF ⊔ σG 6= σ(F ⊔ G) in
general. We write CharF for the presheaf of sections of the characteristic sheaf χU ,
provided by the inclusion of the open subset U →֒ B.
As a simple illustration, let us discuss the difference between the interpretations of ∇
and ¬¬ in a subset/presheaf-valued model. Since Supp(F ) is always open for a presheaf
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F , |!?Φ| = Char V , where V = Supp |Φ|. On the other hand, by [1; ??], |¬Φ| = CharU ,
where U = Int(B \ V ). Hence |¬¬Φ| = Char V ′, where V ′ = Int(B \ U) = Int(Cl V ).
Theorem 4.7. Subset/sheaf- and subset/presheaf-valued structures are models of QHC.
Proof. It is well-known that subsets interpret classical predicate logic (see [6]). It is also
known that sheaves and presheaves interpret intuitionistic predicate logic (see [1; §??]).
Thus it remains to check that the additional laws and inference rules of QHC are satisfied
in subset/(pre)sheaf-valued structures.
(?⊤)
α
?α
;
(!⊤)
p
!p
.
Indeed, if |α| has a global section, then Supp |α| = B. Conversely, if |p| = B, then
Char(Int |p|) has a global section.
(?
→
) ·?(α→ β) −→ (?α→ ?β)
This holds since SuppHom(F,G) ⊂ Int ( SuppG ∪ (B \ SuppF )) (see [1; ??]).
(!
→
) · !(p→ q) −→ (!p→ !q).
We have |!(p→ q)| = CharU , where U = Int |p→ q| = Int ((B \ |p|) ∪ |q|). On
the other hand, |!p→ !q| = Hom (Char(Int |p|),Char(Int |q|)). By [1; ??(a)], the latter
presheaf is isomorphic to Char V , where V = Int
(
(B \ Int |p|) ∪ Int |q|).
To construct a presheaf morphism CharU → Char V , it suffices to show that U ⊂ V .
If b ∈ U , then b has an open neighborhood W in B such that W ⊂ (B \ |p|) ∪ |q|.
Then W ∩ |p| ⊂ W ∩ |q|. Hence IntW (W ∩ |p|) ⊂ IntW (W ∩ |q|). Since W is open,
IntW (W ∩ S) = W ∩ Int S for any S ⊂ B. Then W ∩ Int |p| ⊂ W ∩ Int |q|. Hence
W ⊂ (B \ Int |p|) ∪ Int |q|. Thus b ∈ V .
(!⊥) ¬!⊥.
Since ⊢ ⊥ ↔ p∧¬p, we have |⊥| = ∅, so |!⊥| is the empty sheaf. Hence |!⊥ →×| =
Hom(Char∅,Char∅) = CharB.
(?!) ·?!p→ p.
We have |?!p| = Int |p|, so |?!p→ p| = |¬?!p ∨ p| = (B \ Int |p|) ∪ |p| = B.
(!?) ·α→ !?α.
Since Supp(F ) is always open, |!?α| = Char V , where V = Supp |α|. In other words,
V is the union of all open sets U such that |α|(U) 6= ∅. Thus |!?α|(U) = {idU} if
|α|(U) 6= ∅, and else |!?α|(U) = ∅. Then the constant maps ϕ(U) : |α|(U)→ |!?α|(U),
s 7→ idU , combine into a natural transformation ϕ : |α| → |!?α|. 
Interior-based models of QHC are not the same as subset/(pre)sheaf-valued models
of QHC where all problem variables are interpreted by the characteristic (pre)sheaves of
open subsets of B. Indeed, formulas containing ∨ and ∃ will generally not be interpreted
by such (pre)sheaves, but only by their coproducts. In fact, the connection between
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subset/(pre)sheaf and interior-based models is provided by the ∇-translation, A 7→ A∇
(see [2; §??]):
Proposition 4.8. Every subset/(pre)sheaf-valued modelM determines an interior-based
model M∇: the interpretation of a formula A of QHC in M∇ is |A|M∇ := |A∇|M .
Remark 4.9. By [2; Theorem ??], if Φ is a formula of intuitionistic logic, ⊢ Φ if and only
if ⊢ Φ∇. This meta-judgement cannot be internalized. Indeed, for Φ = ∀x ∃yα(x, y) it
follows from [1; Proposition ??] that Φ∇ 6⊢ Φ and also ¬Φ 6⊢ (¬Φ)∇.
Remark 4.10. The class of models of QHC pulled back from sheaf models via the ♦-
translation can be described as follows in closed terms:
• We fix a topological space B and a domain 풟.
• The intuitionistic side is interpreted as in the sheaf-valued model in B, with 풟;
• The classical side is interpreted as in a regularization-based model in B, with 풟;
• |!F | = χ|F |, the sheaf provided by the inclusion |F | →֒ B.
• |?Φ| = IntCl(Supp |Φ|), the regularization of Supp |Φ|.
These models satisfy the K-principle (e.g. in the form ·p↔ p) and so do not seem
to add much new with respect to regularization-based models.
4.5. Principles revisited
Theorem 4.11. (a) The R-principle (and hence also the H-, K- and PC-principles);
the D-principle and the PC-rule; and the ∀-, ∀∇-, ∃- and ∃∇-principles are not valid
in some subset/sheaf-valued models.
(b) The ED-principle is valid in all subset/sheaf-valued models.
Proof. (a). The PC-rule is trivial to refute; for instance, the sheaf χ(−∞,1)⊔χ(−1,∞) over
R has no global sections, yet its support is the entire R.
The D- and ∃∇-principles assert that ∇ commutes with intuitionistic ∨ and ∃. This
is not the case for the characteristic sheaves of any non-disjoint open subsets of B not
contained one in another.
The ∃- and ∀-principles are written essentially in the language of QS4 and so can
be refuted just like in the proof of Theorem 4.4.
Models where the ∀∇- and R-principles fail are given by [1; ?? and ??], respectively.

(b). Since ⊢ !¬?Φ ↔ ¬Φ, the equivalent rule form 3.32(i) of the ED-principle can be
obtained from
!¬(p ∧ q)
!(p ∨ q)→ !p ∨ !q by substituting p, q with ?α, ?β. The latter rule is
equivalent to
¬(p ∧ q)
!(p ∨ q)→ !p ∨ !q . We will show that ¬(p ∧ q) ⇒ !(p ∨ q) → !p ∨ !q is
valid in any subset/sheaf-valued model with respect to any valuation 퓋 such that the
sets |p|퓋 and |q|퓋 are open. Indeed, ¬(p ∧ q) is valid with respect to some 퓋 if and
only if the sets |p|퓋 and |q|퓋 are disjoint. But given that they are disjoint, the sheaves
|!(p ∨ q)|퓋 and |!p|퓋 ⊔ |!q|퓋 are clearly isomorphic. 
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Proposition 4.12. (a) The R-principle follows neither from the PC-rule nor from the
D-principle.
(b) The PC-rule implies neither the D-principle nor the ∃∇-principle.
(c) The PC-rule does not imply the ∀∇-principle.
Proof. (a). Let us consider the subset/sheaf-valued model of QHC in R2 with some 풟
and let us fix the valuation 퓋 that assigns to each n-ary problem variable and each n-
tuple of elements of풟 the sheaf G of Example [1; ??] (the nontrivial double covering over
R2\{0}) and to each n-ary predicate variable and each n-tuple of elements of풟 the subset
∅ of R2. Then the R-principle is not valid with respect to the valuation field 〈퓋〉, since
for F = ∇α and G = α, |∇F →∇G|퓋 = χR2 , whereas |∇(F → G)|퓋 has empty stalk at
0. On the other hand, for any formula A, its interpretation |A|퓋
퓊
with respect to 퓋 and
some variable assignment 퓊 is obtainable from G and ∅ by the operations that interpret
the connectives of QHC (sheaf-theoretic operations, set-theoretic operations, and the
operators F 7→ SuppF and S 7→ χS). Let us note that G and ∅ are invariant under
linear transformations of R2. Hence so is any sheaf of the form |Φ|퓋
퓊
. Consequently, for
any valuation 퓋′ ∈ 〈퓋〉, any assignment 퓊 and any problem variable ϕ, |ϕ|퓋′
퓊
is invariant
under linear transformations of R2. Hence also any sheaf F of the form |Φ|퓋′
퓊
is invariant
under linear transformations of R2.
If F0 6= ∅, then F has a section over some neighborhood of 0 in R2. But then by
the scaling invariance F must have a global section. Thus, in particular, ∇α /α is valid
with respect to 〈퓋〉.
If Fp 6= ∅ for some p 6= 0, then by the scaling and rotation invariance Fq 6= ∅
for all q 6= 0. Thus there are only three possibilities for SuppF : either ∅, or R2, or
R2 \ {0}. Then for any other sheaf F ′ of the form |Φ|퓋′
퓊
, either SuppF ⊂ SuppF ′ or
SuppF ′ ⊂ SuppF . Hence ·∇(α ∨ β)→ ∇α ∨ ∇β is valid with respect to 〈퓋〉. 
(b). Let us consider the subset/sheaf-valued model of QHC in R2 with some 풟 and let
us fix a valuation 퓋 that assigns to each n-ary predicate variable and each n-tuple of
elements of 풟 one of the subsets U = {(x, y) | x > 0} and V = {(x, y) | y > 0} of
R2 and to each n-ary problem variable and each n-tuple of elements of 풟 the sheaf χ∅.
Since U , V and χ∅ are invariant under scaling of R
2, so is the interpretation of any
formula. Similarly to the proof of (a), we get that ∇α/α is valid with respect to 〈퓋〉.
On the other hand, there exist no sheaf morphisms Char(U ∪V )→ CharU ⊔Char V , so
∇(α ∨ β)→∇α ∨ ∇β is not valid with respect to an appropriately chosen 퓋, and thus
·∇(α ∨ β)→ ∇α ∨ ∇β is not valid with respect to 〈퓋〉. If we consider a two-element
domain 풟, we similarly get that the ∃∇-principle is not valid with respect to 〈퓋〉, using
an appropriately chosen 퓋 of the above form. 
(c). Let U = {reiϕ ∈ C | r > 0, 0 < ϕ < 2π} and Vn = {reiϕ ∈ C | r > 0, − 1n < ϕ < 1n}.
Let us consider the subset/sheaf-valued model of QHC in R2 with 풟 = N and let us
fix the valuation 퓋 that assigns to each unary problem variable the family of sheaves
CharU ⊔Char Vn, n ∈ N, and to each n-ary predicate variable, n 6= 1, and each n-tuple
of elements of 풟 the sheaf χ∅, and to each n-ary predicate variable and each n-tuple of
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elements of 풟 the subset ∅ of R2. Since U , V1, v2, . . . and χ∅ are invariant under scaling
of C (i.e., multiplication by a real number), so is the interpretation of any formula. Hence
it follows as in (a) that ∇α/α is valid with respect to 〈퓋〉.
On the other hand, for the unary problem variable β we have |∇β|퓋(n) = Char(C\{0})
for each n, hence also |∀x∇β(x)|퓋 = Char(C\{0}); whereas |∇∀xβ(x)|퓋 = CharU . Thus
the ∀∇-principle is not valid with respect to 〈퓋〉. 
4.6. Summary
Problem 4.13. Does the PC-rule imply the ED-principle?
Theorem 4.14. The only implications between the K-, H-, R-, D-, ED-, PC-, ∀-, ∀∇-,
∃- and ∃∇-principles and the PC-rule are as follows (apart from the self-implications),
with exception of the potential implication in the previous problem:
(1) The PC-principle implies the R-, D-, ED-, ∀∇, ∃∇-principles and the PC-rule;
(2) The K-principle implies the H-, R-, ∀ and ∃-principles;
(3) The H-principle implies the R-principle and the ∀-principle;
(4) The D-principle implies the ED-principle;
(5) The ∃-principle implies the ∀-principle.
Proof. The PC-principle, ·∇α↔ α, clearly implies the PC-rule ∇α /α, the R-principle
· (∇α → ∇β)→ ∇(α→ β), the D-principle ·∇(α ∨ β)→ (∇α ∨ ∇β), the ∀∇-principle
·∇∀xα(x) ↔ ∀x∇α(x) and the ∃∇-principle ·∃x∇α(x) ↔ ∇∃xα(x). Also clearly the
D-principle implies the ED-principle.
By 3.3 and 3.4, the K-principle implies the H-principle. By 3.12 and 3.23 the H-
principle implies the R-principle and the ∀-principle; and by 3.24, the ∃-principle
implies the ∀-principle.
It remains to show that there are no other implications. By Theorem 4.4, each of
the principles/rules in (1) implies none of the principles in (2), except possibly the
R-principle, which is in (1); and each of the principles in (2) implies none of the prin-
ciples/rules in (1), except possibly the R-principle, which is in (2). Then it remains to
show that there no extra implications between the principles/rules in (1), and no extra
implications between the principles in (2). Also, by Theorem 4.4, the R-principle implies
no other principles/rules in (1) and (2).
By Theorem 4.11, the ED-principle implies no other principles/rules in (1). By 3.26,
4.5(b) and 4.12(a), the D-principle does not imply any of the R-, ∃∇- and ∀∇-principles
and the PC-rule. Hence it also does not imply the PC-principle, and thus it implies only
the principles in (4). By 4.12, the PC-rule does not imply any of the principles in (1),
except possibly the ED-principle. (Also, by 3.11 if the PC-rule implies the R-principle,
then it also implies the PC-principle, and consequently also e.g. the D-principle.) By
3.26, the ∃∇- and ∀∇-principles do not imply one another. They also do not imply any of
the other principles/rules in (1) by considering models with singleton domains, in which
the ∃∇- and ∀∇-principles are trivially valid.
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By 4.5, the H-principle implies only the principles in (3). By 3.25, the ∀-principle
does not imply the ∃-principle. The ∀- and ∃-principles also do not imply any of the
other three principles in (2) by considering models with singleton domains, in which the
∀- and ∃-principles are trivially valid. 
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